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Abstract 
Pricing research suggests incentive-compatible evaluations when consumers’ situation-specific WTP 
is to be elicited. Especially, the lottery-based Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-mechanism (BDM) is 
recommended, as it seems to outperform other elicitation methods. In this study, the BDM was used 
to measure subjects’ WTP for eight shopping goods in binding purchase settings. In accordance with 
previous studies, the validity of elicited WTP measures was checked within subjects with respect to 
indicators of face and criterion validity (such as interest in buying, preference ratings, and 
compliance rates). In addition, this study observed real purchases of a separate validation sample 
measured under identical circumstances, thus assessing the predictive validity of WTPs elicited with 
the BDM. As a result, the BDM-based WTPs reveal a sufficient degree of internal face and criterion 
validity. However, the external validity in terms of predictive validity between WTP-based prediction 
and purchases of the validation sample seems limited. Specifically, this study found a substantial 
overestimation of WTP, and thus in the corresponding purchase rates in the BDM. Hence, a potential 
bias is indicated. However, contrary to the suggestions of earlier research, individual risk attitude or 
loss aversion, hence a potential gambling effect, seems not to bias BDM results or the decision 
whether to buy or not.  
Keywords: BDM, price research, WTP, gambling effect, risk attitude   
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1. Introduction 
The influence of the pricing policy on the bottom line of any company cannot be overestimated. The 
price determines whether a potential customer buys a product or chooses a competitive offer. In this 
way the prevailing market price has doubled impact on profits; it also affects variable production costs 
as well as the revenue of any company (Diller, 2007). Hence, price constitutes one of the most 
effective drivers of profits (Simon, 2004). Therefore, designing an optimal pricing policy is a major 
challenge within a company’s marketing strategy. The pricing policy is necessarily based on the 
managers’ understanding of consumers’ preferences and demand behavior as these determine 
perceived value; that is, utility (Marshall, 1920) of a market offer for a customer. The perceived utility 
is the fundamental building block of customers’ willingness to pay (hereafter WTP; Kalish & Nelson, 
1991), and thus the basis for profit-optimizing prices. In order to determine this elementary component 
and thus to infer optimal decisions, market researchers need valid and feasible elicitation methods. 
With regard to this issue, academic literature has proposed several different approaches to measure 
consumers’ WTP as a surrogate of perceived utility (for further insights into measurement methods of 
WTP see Le Gall-Ely (2009) and Völckner (2006b). The most promising approach seems to be the 
incentive-compatible procedures that emerged from experimental economics (Hoffman, Menkhaus, 
Chakravarti, Field, & Whipple, 1993; Miller, Hofstetter, Krohmer, & Zhang, 2011; Völckner, 2006a; 
Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). These methods offer some appealing properties since they combine the 
theoretical advantage of real transaction data and the operational advantage of survey data. In 
particular, these procedures are theoretically assumed to provide consumers with the incentive to 
truthfully reveal their WTP, as the subjects are put in a real purchase situation in which they are asked 
to make a binding purchase offer for the relevant product, without being able to actually directly 
influence the final selling price with their offer (Shogren et al., 2001; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002, p. 
230). One of the most widely used methods is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (hereafter 
BDM, Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964). Here participants are asked to submit their WTP for a 
given good. The actual sales price is then randomly drawn from an (unknown) distribution of prices. 
Participants are required to purchase the good at a price below or equal to their bids, but they cannot 
buy the good at a price above their bids (Becker et al., 1964)1. For a graphical representation see figure 
1. 
                                                          
1 In the original research design of Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak a minimum selling price from the seller 
instead of a maximum buying price from the buyer was elicited; however, the latter is the common approach in 
recent price research, see e.g., Müller, Kroll, & Vogt, 2012a; Völckner, 2006a; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002. 
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It has been shown that this procedure is (theoretical) incentive compatible (Irwin, McClelland, McKee, 
Schulze, & Norden, 1998), but it seems unclear whether the BDM is also behaviorally incentive 
compatible (Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006), especially if distortions of expected utility theory arise, which is 
the theoretical foundation of the incentive compatibility of the BDM procedure (Horowitz, 2006). 
When looking at the existing literature on price research, it seems the major concern in the evaluation 
of WTP elicitation methods is on incentive compatibility (see e.g., Ding, Grewal, and Liechty, 2005; 
Horowitz, 2006; Irwin et al., 1998; Kaas and Ruprecht, 2006; Lusk, Alexander, and Rousu, 2007; 
McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Miller et al., 2011; Rutström, 1998; Völckner, 2006a; Wang, 
Venkatesh, and Chatterjee, 2007; Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002). However, if (price) research results 
are to be transferred beyond the specific research setting, their external validity must not be neglected 
(Ehrenberg, 1993; Hubbard & Armstrong, 1994; Winer, 1999). Thus far the external validity was 
assessed several times (see e.g., Horowitz, 2006; Völckner, 2006a; Wertenbroch, and Skiera, 2002) 
and compared to other (incentive compatible) WTP elicitation methods (see e.g., Miller et al. 2011; 
Müller, Voigt, and Erichson, 2010; Noussair, Robin, & Ruffieux, 2004). Even so, BDM seems to 
perform best in most of the comparisons among the methods tested (Völckner, 2006a; Völckner, 
2006b; Miller et al., 2011) Yet, it still tends to over- (Müller and Voigt, 2010) or underestimate (Kaas 
Ruprecht, 2006) true WTP elicited at the POS in some occasions. In this context predictive validity as 
important building block of external validity plays a crucial role. Especially, as some sources question 
the predictive validity of BDM results. For example, Ding et al. (2005) found weaknesses in the 
congruence between the predicted choice and the actual choice. The BDM prediction was correct in 
only 15% of the cases. Yet, no compelling empirical explanation of this incongruence on the basis of 
personal characteristics and/or values can be found. Moreover, existing research testing the predictive 
validity of BDM results focuses at the comparison of lab versus field based results. Given the high 
context and situation specificity of WTP (Bateman, Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1997; 
Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 
1985) this is very likely to produce significant differences per se. An evaluation of whether the BDM 
Figure 1: Classical BDM procedure 
3 
 
procedure as such might be a source of biase as it interacts with personal traits, is hard to tell, if many 
facorts are altered at the same time, hence in a field setting.  
This research sets out to test the predictive validity of the BDM procedure and thus assesses the 
external validity of results with the aim of generalizing them to situations perceived to match the point 
of sale (hereafter POS) situation closer; that is, being perceived as more realistic than the BDM. 
Specifically, this study compares the predicted purchase rates (hereafter PR) from the BDM for eight 
shopping goods to the real PR of a matched validation sample in which the participants faced a 
dichotomous choice task (hereafter DCT) on whether to buy or not to buy at the presented sales 
prices2; that is, the open-ended elicitation of the willingness to buy (hereafter WTB). This benchmark 
is said to predict real purchase behavior better because of its closer resemblance to a real purchase 
situation (Müller et al., 2010; Völckner, 2006b) and its cognitive simplicity (Mitchell & Carson, 
1989). To account for the high context and situation specificity of WTP/WTB an identical setting for 
both groups was created to equalize as many relevant background factors (Lynch, 1982; 1999) as 
possible. In fact, this study measured the WTP in the BDM condition and the PR of the DCT 
(partially) at the same time in the same laboratory. So the aim of the DCT was not to elicit true WTB, 
but to validate the predicted PR from the BDM, as this elicitation procedure is closer to a real purchase 
decision at the POS (Müller et al., 2010), and the real purchase situation is truly what the BDM is 
supposed to predict. If the BDM is a good predictor for WTB, one would expect small or no 
differences between the predicted and real PR.  
As this study finds a significant difference between the PR predicted by the BDM and the real PR 
from the DCT, it investigates possible explanations as being the risk attitude (de Meza & Reyniers, 
2013; Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006) of participants and the gambling effect (Völckner, 2006a).  
This paper proceeds as follows. First, it sheds light on WTP elicitation methods with a special focus at 
the BDM. Then it highlights drawbacks of the procedure and potential sources of bias. After the 
presentation of experimental design aspects to prevent known sources of bias, this paper finally 
discusses its findings and limitations. 
2. Aspects of Validity in WTP Elicitation Methods 
If there is adequate data reliability, the quality of WTP estimates depends on their validity. Hence, in 
order to improve the BDM procedure, it is crucial to identify potential sources of systematic bias and 
analyze how to reduce bias. While external validity is significant when validating results for pricing 
purposes, research on the validity of WTP elicitation methods is rather limited (see Ding et al., 2005; 
Miller et al., 2011; Müller et al., 2010). Examining whether a method provides valid estimates of WTP 
is a complex task, since the WTP is a latent, and thus an unobservable, construct (Völckner, 2006a).  
                                                          
2 This is a prices point chosen from the price density function of the BDM.  
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Moreover, it is not possible to prove external validity: It can only be assessed through other means 
(see the dialogue between Calder, Phillips, and Tybout (1981; 1982) and Lynch (1982; 1983; 1999). 
Therefore, different conceptions and means of validity have been used to test the validity of research 
results. Specifically, researchers most often use the concepts of face and criterion validity to check 
whether their results are meaningful. However, testing whether results are generalizable requires 
further consideration (Hubbard & Armstrong, 1994). Comparative studies that examine the extent to 
which results from different procedures are consistent, and therefore test convergent validity, represent 
a step toward generalizability3 because they also test the predictive validity of results. However, a 
replication (with extension) of the original study is a true test of external validity. This can be 
accomplished by a careful, theory-based variation of research components (for example, the research 
setting or the sample composition) to test whether earlier results hold under different situations that go 
beyond the original research frame (robustness), or might even be generalizable (Hubbard & 
Armstrong, 1994; Lynch, 1999).  
Literature on WTP elicitation methods provides some general aspects to keep in mind during price 
research. Usually, methods that elicit WTP in a binding setting, that is a real purchase situation, are 
assumed to provide higher validity than those that elicit hypothetical WTP. The main concern is that 
hypothetical methods might lead to systematically biased estimates, as participants apply less effort to 
their calculation and thus define their WTP inaccurately, because their responses do not have real 
economic consequences (Ding et al., 2005). Several empirical studies give evidence for the existence 
of such a hypothetical bias (Miller et al., 2011; Völckner, 2006a; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). In 
general, elicitations in hypothetical settings seem to generate significantly higher valuations than their 
counterparts in real settings, across and within different methods (List & Gallet, 2001; Murphy, Allen, 
Stevens, & Weatherhead, 2005). However, this is not to say that hypothetical approaches are of no 
value in guiding pricing decisions as Miller et al. notes (2011).  
In addition, there might be a potential strategic bias when direct WTP elicitation methods are used. 
Participants might believe their responses influence future outcomes, such as the likelihood of a new 
product’s market entry, or future market prices (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). Thus, participants in 
both hypothetical and binding settings4 might have an incentive to strategically overstate or understate 
their true WTP in order to maximize their individual utility (Carson & Groves, 2007). In contrast to 
direct methods, indirect methods draw people’s attention away from the pricing decision and therefore 
mitigate strategic response behavior (Wang et al., 2007, p. 203).  
                                                          
3 However, a comparison of results from different incentive-compatible methods with each other provides only 
limited information in the event the results differ. In such a case, at best, only one of the methods empirically 
provides incentive compatibility and thus results that may be generalizable, but one cannot determine which one, 
if any, it is (Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006). 
4 In binding settings, however, strategic responses seem to be less likely, as participants have to consider the cost 
of deviating from their true WTP that occur either as a forgone purchase opportunity or an obligating purchase 
price above their actual WTP. 
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The observed context dependence of WTP indicates that a valid method should imitate the real 
purchase situation, with regard to the truly influential background factors affecting WTP (Lynch, 
1999), as closely as possible (Hofstetter & Miller, 2009; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). The theory of 
“bounded rationality” suggests that environmental characteristics influence consumers’ choices 
(Simon, 1955). Furthermore, because consumers construct their preferences with regard to the choice 
context rather than reveal pre-defined preferences (Bettman et al., 1998), it becomes clear that the 
decision context is part of an individual’s utility function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
2.1 Evaluation of the BDM 
The BDM has been tested and evaluated a number of times (see e.g., Miller et al., 2011; Müller et al., 
2010; Noussair et al., 2004; Völckner 2006a; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). Most of the evidence 
shows that the BDM has some appealing properties that make it meaningful and contribute to its broad 
usage in scientific research. Several studies indicate that the BDM is (theoretically) incentive 
compatible (Hofstetter & Miller, 2009; Irwin et al., 1998; Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002, among 
others), as long as expected utility theory applies (Horowitz, 2006), which, apart from the operational 
advantages, is the most important benefit of the BDM. Furthermore, Wang et al. (2007) suggest a high 
level of internal and external validity; the findings of Miller et al. (2011), who found the BDM results 
to fit real demand curves best, support this suggestion. On the basis of their results, Wertenbroch and 
Skiera (2002) also argue in favor of high face, internal, and criterion validity. Additionally, they 
showed the robustness of BDM results in the case of WTP elicitation at the POS under real market 
conditions. 
A rather disputable point is whether the BDM is easy to understand. Hofstetter and Miller (2009) and 
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) argue that the procedure is transparent and well understood by the 
participating subjects. However, Schreier and Werfer (2007) find the understanding to be a source of 
potentially biased results, and Völckner (2006b) lists several studies (Kagel & Levin, 1993, among 
others) that show problems with understanding – at least, understanding the dominant strategy – of the 
BDM  
Although the BDM might be a clearly recommendable method to elicit WTP in theory, its application 
is limited to academic research, as it seems to play no role in the practice of market research (Steiner 
& Hendus, 2012). Moreover, even though the BDM is (theoretically) incentive compatible, it has some 
limitations, which might explain its infrequent application in market research.  
First, the procedure might be applicable to existing, low-priced products only5, as incentive 
compatibility is bound to the binding character of the purchase, in case there is no sellable product, or 
any kind of limited liquidity of the participants might lead to biased WTP results, as demand is 
artificially decreased (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). Kaas and Ruprecht (2006) even suggest a high 
underestimation of WTP in the case of new and high-involvement products. 
                                                          
5 Recently, however, Lieven and Lennerts (2013) successfully applied the BDM to non-existing products with 
the help of vouchers, which are bought on the spot and redeemable once the product is marketed. 
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Second, as the BDM is often applied in the laboratory, it also faces typical concerns raised in artificial 
environments and potentially resulting in biases therefrom (Irwin et al., 1998). Muller and Ruffieux 
(2011, p. 183) suggest congruency between the experimental situation and the real purchase situation 
is critical, as it points favorably to external validity. A less important point in this realm seems to be 
the presence of price tags, which are easy to include in the experimental procedure (see this study). 
However, in case no price tags are available to the participants, it might lead to a situation in which 
risk-averse decision-makers, who are uncertain about the market price, will include this uncertainty in 
the form of a risk premium in their WTP statement. In fact, this leads to reduced WTP, and there will 
be no disclosure of the true WTP (Muller & Ruffieux, 2011). Moreover, Harrison, Harstad, and 
Rutström (2004) show that in a binding context, either the subjectively perceived or objective market 
prices censor the WTP, that is, field-price censoring.  
Third, the decisions in – and therefore perhaps the results of – the BDM and a real purchase situation 
are quite different. The BDM asks for a maximum amount a person is willing to pay for a certain 
product; however, at the POS the consumer has only to decide whether to buy at a given price or not.  
Fourth, as a direct WTP elicitation method, the BDM might suffer from high price consciousness and 
potential strategic bidding behavior (Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006; Le Gall-Ely, 2009; Simon & Kucher, 
1988) 
Fifth, there have been concerns that the range of the prices used within the BDM procedure to 
determine the final selling price (distributional dependence) possibly affects the respondents and that 
consequently the price bids deviate from expected utility theory (Horowitz, 2006).  
Other (incentive-compatible) WTP elicitation methods raise the concerns above as well, and thus it is 
rather a question of how the BDM is implemented, that is, the setting and presentation of stimuli. It is 
often possible to address these concerns in an appropriate experimental design that (i) uses existing 
products with real demand and prevents cash limitations of the participants, (ii) accounts for the 
situation specificity of the WTP by resemblance of important background factors of real POS 
purchases, and (iii) investigates potential influences of the BDM procedure that might give rise to bias, 
as the methods we use to measure our results always influence these results (Stewart, 2009). The 
potential interaction effects of the participants’ personal traits and the way the BDM is conducted 
(lottery) are of particular interest. Subsection 2.2 discusses the possibility of such interactions, and the 
subsequent section 3 suggests an appropriate experimental design.  
2.2 Potential Distortions of BDM Results Due to Gambling  
For the BDM, Völckner (2006b) suggested that possible strategic underbidding or overbidding might 
be the result of the BDM procedure’s specific setup. In fact, the procedure originated in experimental 
economics and has been designed to elicit the certainty equivalent of monetary lotteries (Becker et al., 
1964). To prove incentive compatibility, the authors based their argument on the assumptions of 
expected utility theory (Becker et al., 1964). Even so, this is a traditional economic approach when 
dealing with risky choices such as the outcomes of lotteries (Edwards, 1954). It might be that one 
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cannot automatically assume bidders to have a pre-defined utility function and make risky choices in 
such a way that they maximize their expected utility, as predicted in theory. In general, economic 
literature has observed that violations of the independence axiom, which implies a preference function 
that is linear in probabilities, mainly harm the validity of expected utility theory empirically (Machina, 
1982). Edwards (1954) proposed that bidders have probability preferences; for instance, they prefer a 
low probability of making large losses over a high probability of making small losses. Independence is 
violated mainly when people overweight the low probability of extreme outcomes, as has been 
frequently observed (Machina, 1982). Karni and Safra (1987) provided evidence that the BDM 
mechanism is not incentive compatible for eliciting the certainty equivalent of lotteries if bidders’ 
preference relations violate the expected utility hypothesis. More recently, Horowitz (2006) claimed 
that this result holds true, even for non-random goods, under the assumption that the distribution of 
prices affects bidders’ responses.  
A popular approach contrary to the expected utility hypothesis is prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory states that utility is determined rather by relative changes in wealth 
compared with a reference point – perceived as either gains or losses – than by the absolute value of an 
outcome. The expected utility of a risky choice in prospect theory is shaped by the assumptions that 
losses loom larger than gains, and low probabilities are overweighted (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Especially when participants are uncertain about their explicit WTP, prospect theory – in particular 
loss aversion – might imply systematic underbidding in the BDM (Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006). In 
addition, it would be advisable to consider the idea of regret (Horowitz, 2006). People might derive 
disutility from forgoing the opportunity to purchase. In particular, regret might affect external validity 
if it implies some kind of gambling behavior that is tied to the BDM’s lottery setting. Consequently, 
participants could be willing to pay a higher price in a BDM setting than they would actually pay in a 
real market. 
If potential gambling effects (Völckner, 2006a, pp. 139-140) or the closely linked risk attitude (de 
Meza & Reyniers, 2013) play a role in WTP elicitation, it is important to remember that the classical 
theory of expected utility does not account for gambling effects (Diecidue, Schmidt, & Wakker, 2004; 
Fishburn, 1980; Luce & Marley, 2000). In fact, the utility of gambling has been “considered the main 
cause of deviation from expected utility in the economics literature up to 1944” (Diecidue et al., 2004, 
p. 242). In other words, the procedure might potentially allow interactions with specific personal traits, 
such as risk attitude or loss aversion. As the BDM procedure (as depicted in Figure 1) includes a 
lottery, such interactions seem very likely. 
The bidder cannot directly influence the final selling price, which is the basis for incentive 
compatibility, but can influence the odds of winning the lottery. Hence, the subject’s propensity for 
gambling might influence the results. Diecidue et al. (2004) argue that the incorporation of a risky 
option (e.g., in the form of uncertainty about the final selling price) will change the decision context, 
which leads to a different valuation function. This means the possibility of gambling potentially leads 
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to additional (dis)utility for respondents in a BDM procedure, as the included lottery might represent a 
risky situation for them. “People do perceive a categorical difference between risky and riskless. As 
soon as a sure outcome is changed into a risky gamble, no matter how small the risk, new emotions are 
triggered, and people turn to a different evaluation procedure, the one for risky choices” (Diecidue et 
al., 2004, p. 243). As Tversky (1967) explicitly highlighted, gambling has some kind of utility, which 
can affect the differences between risky and riskless utilities. In this context, the BDM as a kind of 
lottery might yield different utility for different kinds of people depending on the degree of individual 
risk aversion. 
To risk loving respondents, the BDM lottery might offer a positive additional utility, as the utility of 
gambling overcompensates the disutility (or cost) of gambling. This might lead to an overstated WTP, 
as the additional utility is positively priced into the WTP bid. By contrast, in the case of risk-averse 
respondents, the disutility of gambling might outweigh the positive utility of gambling and thus lead to 
understated WTP.  
The transformation function weighting these potential additional positive or negative utilities from 
gambling is individual and therefore different for different degrees of risk aversion (Diecidue et al., 
2004). This means the BDM might systematically elicit different WTPs for different levels of risk 
attitude, or for people who are prone to gambling, versus those who are not. This might be the result of 
either the differently perceived utility of the overall situation (i.e., overall utility; which is the utility of 
the product plus the utility gained or reduced by the procedure (lottery)) or, as suggested, a different 
perception of the probabilities in the lottery, which influences the perceived utility (Diecidue et al., 
2004). If there is a gambling effect, the BDM procedure, which includes a lottery, should yield 
different utility for different degrees of risk attitude and/or loss aversion. Consequently, this study 
hypothesizes that if a gambling effect influences the WTP elicited with the BDM, this WTP is 
significantly different for risk-averse and less risk-averse participants, and/or for different degrees of 
loss aversion. 
2.3  Derived Hypotheses 
The work above leads us to the following hypotheses: 
The WTB derived from the stated WTP in the BDM procedure predicts the PR in the DCT procedure. 
H1a: The estimated purchase rates from BDM and DCT are identical. 
In case a significant difference exists in these estimates, this might be due to:  
H1b: differences in perceived degree of realism. The bids of participants with an above-mean level of 
perceived degree of realism will be significantly different from those of participants scoring below the 
mean. 
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H1c: differences in risk attitude. The bids of participants with an above-mean level of risk attitude will 
be significantly different from those of participants scoring below the mean. 
H1d: differences in loss aversion in risky choice (number of lotteries played). The bids of participants 
with an above-mean level of loss aversion will be significantly different from those of participants 
scoring below the mean. 
3. Method and Study Design  
3.1 Toward an Appropriate WTP Elicitation Procedure 
As highlighted above, the BDM has several appealing properties. However, the BDM is not immune 
to potential biases. A careful setup of the procedure is mandatory, because for the most potential 
biases are stemming from the participants of the study, the specific purchase situation created, and the 
specific character of the BDM mechanism. In the following, the paper reports on these important 
issues for WTP elicitation (for a detailed overview of the experimental procedure, see Figure 2 in 
Section 2.2.). 
Preventing issues linked to demand and financial matters 
This study used a non-convenience sample, in accordance with Ding et al. (2005) and Müller et al. 
(2010). Participants were pre-screened for their interest in buying at least three of eight products, in 
order to ensure this study employs meaningful products for the participants of the experiment and thus 
avoid a negative demand bias in WTP/WTB measures. 
This study implemented out-of-pocket transactions to avoid any “house-money effect,” that is 
increased risk-seeking in the presence of a prior gain (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). The show-up fee was 
handed over directly, while the recruitment took place, on average, two weeks before the experiment, 
as an initial monetary endowment or participation fee might have affected consumers’ reference point 
and generated biased valuations (Rosenboim & Shavit, 2012; Thaler, 1980). The time span should be 
large enough to avoid any mental accounting, as the fee of €10 should be spent in the meantime. 
Therefore, participants had to pay any purchases out of their own pocket (McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Rosenboim & Shavit, 2012)  
Participants’ liquidity constraints might provoke downward-biased WTP estimates (Wertenbroch & 
Skiera, 2002, p. 238) when they are dealing with goods that are more expensive. To circumvent this 
limitation, all eligible participants were advised to bring €70 in cash to the experiment. 
Taking the situation specificity of WTP into account 
This point addresses the parallelism between the laboratory and the real purchase situation. During a 
review of the empirical results, it becomes clear that the BDM results are not necessarily the best 
approximation of the true WTP (de Meza & Reyniers, 2013; Horowitz, 2006; Kaas & Ruprecht, 
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2006). A common explanation lies in the artificial environment of laboratory-based studies and the 
potentially perceived risk6 resulting from some uncertainty in the decision context. We took several 
steps to minimize the lack of congruency between a real purchase situation and this laboratory-based 
study, and to limit uncertainty. This study provided all the subjects with about the same amount of 
information that is available at the POS, as suggested by Zhao and Kling (2004). It displayed the 
current market prices in each decision situation as they are a relevant background factor for purchase 
decisions (Carlsson, Frykblom, & Lagerkvist, 2007; Drichoutis, Lazaridis, & Nayga Jr, 2008; Muller 
& Ruffieux, 2011). Moreover, at each participant’s place we placed a catalog containing key product 
characteristics (including the market price again), a short description from the producer of each of the 
eight products, and a product evaluation in the form of the original Amazon customer product 
feedback (for an example, see Appendix 1). This catalogue could be used to support any potential 
purchase decision. Improving people’s knowledge about the products would first increase congruency 
and second reduce perceived uncertainty.  
Control of BDM specific issues affecting WTP 
When eliciting homegrown values, it is possible to improve the accuracy of bids, that is for example 
less systematic underbidding in the first rounds (Noussair et al., 2004) and other systematic distortions 
due to a lack of understanding (Völckner, 2006b, p. 51), by learning through repetition and explicit 
instructions or explanations of the dominant strategy (Rutström, 1998). Therefore, this study engaged 
participants in a training trial before the experiment started, as several researchers have suggested 
(Plott & Zeiler, 2005; Völckner, 2006a; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). To avoid anchoring as much as 
possible, the current example used a different price range from that of the products offered later in the 
experiment. As mentioned above in Section 2.2, there is a debate on the comprehensibility of the 
procedure or at least the dominant strategy. To address this point, this study explained the dominant 
strategy (Irwin et al., 1998) to the respondents and ensured comprehension of the procedure by using 
check-up questions in the computer-based questionnaire, which the participants had to answer 
correctly in order to reach the binding purchase questions. Furthermore, we placed a separate sheet 
explaining the procedure on each place available to the respondents at any time. During the 
experiment, students were encouraged to ask questions and four interviewers per session (20 
participants) handled these questions. 
Behavioral literature stresses that generally preferences are not necessarily known to subjects and are 
rather unstable over time (Kahneman & Snell, 1992). The concept of constructive preferences even 
suggests consumers do not have pre-defined preferences in the first place. The assumption is that they 
construct valuations dependent on the context (Bettman et al., 1998), and thus known experimental 
price cues could serve as an anchor (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003). Tymula, Woelbert, and 
                                                          
6 This study does not use the classical distinction between risk and uncertainty, as suggested by decision theory.  
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Glimcher (2013) suggest two possible situations. In the first, consumers who face uncertainty about 
their true WTP might infer some information from the price distribution (e.g., price as a signal for 
quality). In the second, respondents might conclude that the intrinsic value of a good depends on its 
price. That is to say, price itself would be part of the consumer’s utility. Thus, incentives for truthful 
bidding vary across different distributions of random prices (Lusk et al., 2007). Specifically, under a 
uniform distribution of prices, risk-averse bidders who are uncertain about their true WTP are assumed 
to underestimate their WTP (Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006), since the expected surplus would be greater 
than is the case for overestimation. This is in line with the predictions of Lusk et al. (2007), who argue 
that the degree of underbidding depends on bidders’ expectations or knowledge about the random 
price range and is reduced with less risk aversion. Horowitz (2006) suggests distributional dependence 
even occurs if consumers are conscious of their true WTP but have different perceptions of 
disappointment regarding the outcome of the BDM lottery. Accordingly, a bidder can experience two 
types of ex-post disappointment, namely (1) paying a price above his or her true valuation, and (2) not 
receiving the good at all. In accordance with prospect theory, if a bidder weights these possible 
outcomes differently, price distribution could serve as a reference point to minimize ex-post regret. 
For example, disappointment from not receiving the good might be higher when a bidder’s true WTP 
is relatively higher than the average or most likely price of the distribution. Thus, the bidder would 
likely overstate his or her true WTP to minimize ex-post regret. Consequently, at a given average 
WTP, Horowitz (2006) would predict that a right-skewed distribution could provoke underbidding, 
while a left-skewed distribution could provoke overbidding.  
As Bohm, Lindén, and Sonnegård (1997) and Tymula et al. (2013) proposed, this study used a price 
range for each of the eight products that was unknown to the respondents, in order to avoid anchoring 
effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and limit uncertainty. However, participants were told that it 
would be a range around the current market price, which again was unknown to the participants, this 
study used eight different urns, each with a specific price range from which the subjects chose the final 
selling price. This setup was expected to increase the participants’ confidence in the procedure. The 
range for each product was roughly between –30% and 5% around the stated market price. Within this 
range, we used a uniform probability density function, as suggested by Lusk et al. (2007). 
3.2 Product Choice and Sample 
Prior to the study, two important choices had to be made: the selection of the target population, and the 
determination of purchase-relevant products for the intended sample. The latter decision was based on 
several focus group interviews and pre-tests in which the following four product categories were 
identified as relevant for the defined target population, which comprises students at a major German 
university: electrical toothbrush, whiskey, external hard drive, and headphones. Each category 
consisted of two products from the same brand, to eliminate brand influences on WTB/WTP (Del Rio, 
Vazquez, & Iglesias, 2001; Dodds, Monroe, & Grewal, 1991). However, the products offered had 
different prices and quality options. In all cases this study used well-known brands, with positive user 
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feedback on Amazon.de in order to limit speculation on the quality of the goods. As for the prices, the 
cheapest available price during recruitment from Amazon.de or regional dealers was used7. 
To avoid potential confounding effects between the elicitation of WTP/WTB and the elicitation of 
other psychological constructs, this study also measured individual risk attitude and loss aversion 
(number of lotteries played) during the recruitment process. To measure the first construct, this study 
employed the 11-point risk attitude scale used in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which 
many academic researchers have adopted (see e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011; Jaeger et al., 2010; Van 
Winden, Krawczyk, & Hopfensitz, 2011). Loss aversion (number of lotteries played) was also 
measured during the sampling process using a measure of loss aversion in risky choices. To that end, 
this study adopted a simple lottery choice task (drop of a coin), following Fehr and Goette (2007). In 
this choice task, individuals decide for each of 10 lotteries whether they want to play or reject it (and 
receive nothing). In each lottery, the winning price is fixed at €5.00, and only the losing price varies 
(between €0.00 and €1.90). At the end of the recruitment process, one lottery was randomly selected 
for play to secure independence between the lotteries (Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 1998). 
From 238 recruited students, 222 (93.28%) turned up, which is a satisfactory result. In order to prepare 
the data for analysis, suspicious cases were identified and eliminated: Respondents who either 
indicated in all eight BDM purchase situations a WTP of €0.00 or, in the case of the DCT, selected the 
“no-buy” option in all 16 decisions, were deleted. This was a reasonable step, as the sampling was 
based on the purchase relevance of these products for the participants; if a respondent indicated no 
interest in buying at all, he or she should not be part of the defined target population and therefore, the 
sample. Consequently, six respondents from the BDM and nine from the (DCT) condition were 
excluded. Therefore the net sample for further analysis contains 207 valid responses. For sample 
details, see Table 1 below. 
  
                                                          
7 For a list of all products and corresponding market prices, see Appendix 2. 
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Table 1: Sample composition 
Split N (%) 
Gender Age Origin 
male female 
from 
18 to 22 
from 
23 to 31 
Former 
West 
Germany 
Former 
East 
Germany 
Overall 207 
(100%) 
124 
(59.9%) 
83 
(40.1%) 
107 
(51.7%) 
100 
(48.3%) 
111 
(53.6%) 
96 
(46.4%) 
BDM 107 
(51.7%) 
  60 
(56.1%) 
47 
(43.9%) 
  55 
(51.4%) 
  52 
(48.6%) 
  56 
(52.3%) 
51 
(47.7%) 
DCT 100 
(48.3%) 
  64 
(64.0%) 
36 
(36.0%) 
  52 
(52.0%) 
  48 
(48.0%) 
  55 
(55.0%) 
45 
(45.0%) 
Χ² - 1.352 0.007 0.147 
p - 0.245 0.931 0.701 
 
3.3 Procedure 
The laboratory-based study was run as a computer-aided interview using a between-subjects design. 
Before the random assignment into the experimental splits, the participants had to wait in front of the 
laboratory. This was the first time they saw the products included in the experiment as these were 
presented at a table next to the laboratory entrance. All participants had an opportunity to touch and 
evaluate the products, and everybody was informed about the binding character of the experiment. By 
drawing a seat number upon entering the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
20 computer workstations and one of the two experimental procedures (BDM and DCT).  
 
In order to introduce real choice consequences for all decisions, this study used a random payoff 
mechanism (Grether & Plott, 1979), because participants had to indicate in several purchase situations 
(BDM: 8; DCT: 16) at which price/or which product they wanted to buy, if any. Thus, participants had 
been instructed before the experiment started that they would face several potential purchase 
situations; however, the computer chose only one, at random, for each participant at the end of the 
study. Previous research shows that this mechanism induces independence of choices, as it prevents 
income or portfolio effects that are assumed to bias choices in sequential multistage decisions that a 
single respondent makes (Braga, Humphrey, & Starmer, 2009; Grether & Plott, 1979).  
Both procedures (BDM, DCT) followed the same process. The two questionnaires consisted of three 
parts. The first asks for the origin (former West Germany vs. former East Germany) of the participants 
as well as for purchase interest, price-quality orientation, and demographics such as age, gender, body 
size, and level of education of both parents, which could have an impact on the general willingness to 
take risks (Dohmen et al., 2011). In particular, Dohmen et al. (2011) showed that women are 
significantly less willing to take risks than men in general and in many specific risky types of 
behaviors like car driving, financial matters, and health related issues. Moreover, the authors reveal 
that increasing age reduces willingness to take risks, and that taller individuals and children of parents 
with a higher degree of education are more willing to take risks.  
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The second part contains the binding purchase questions. In the BDM and DCT, these questions were 
asked both in the presence of the market price (the tag value) and with the same decision support 
material. In fact, the only difference was in the method used to elicit product value in terms of WTP 
(BDM) or WTB (DCT): Whereas the BDM asked the participants in eight purchase situations to state 
the maximum amount they would pay, the DCT asked in 16 situations whether the respondents would 
like to buy the product. Here each product was offered at two different prices. First, and in random 
order, the higher price option of all eight products was offered. Second, again in random order, all 
eight products were offered again at the lower price. To be able to compare the predicted PR derived 
from the BDM with the elicited PR from the DCT, this study took two prices for each product from 
the price density function that was derived from the first four experimental sessions in which solely 
WTP with the BDM was elicited (for the session schedule, see Appendix 3). Between the second and 
third parts of the questionnaire, the random payoff mechanism was used to determine the relevant 
binding situation, and in the case of the BDM, the respondents were asked to draw from an urn a price 
from an unknown price range with a uniform distribution around the market price for the specific 
product determined in the random draw just before. For a detailed overview of the experimental 
procedure, see Figure 2.  
The third and last part asks how satisfied respondents are with the result (purchase/no purchase), what 
they think about the final selling price, and whether they would be willing to change their decision for 
the drawn situation if they had a chance to do so.
15
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4. Results 
First, this study tested for structural differences between the BDM and DCT sample. No significant 
differences exist for any of the tested variables: age, gender, body size, education level of parents, 
price versus quality importance, risk attitude, loss aversion in risky choice (number of lotteries 
played), product relevance and interest in buying (all t≤ 1.668, p≥ .097; all χ²≤ 1.926, p≥ .165; see 
Appendices 4–7). This study therefore assumes that both samples are comparable in their 
characteristics. Furthermore, as the price density function that determined the two selling prices in the 
DCT condition was derived from the first four BDM sessions, this study tested whether there is a 
difference between the WTP values elicited in the first four and the successive BDM sessions. The 
results indicate no significant differences (all t≤ 1.087, p≥ .279, see Appendix 8), which suggests that 
the price density functions from the first four BDM sessions can be used safely to select the selling 
prices for DCT. 
4.1 Face and Criterion Validity  
In accordance with Müller et al. (2012a), Völckner (2006a), and Wertenbroch & Skiera (2002), among 
others, the current study tested the meaningfulness of data by comparing the resulting estimates with 
demand-specific data to test face or criterion validity. As a result, BDM and DCT (WTB) seemed to 
lead respondents to calculate and reveal their true WTP for the specific purchase situation, since 
valuations were correlated with demand-specific measures. WTP (all Pearson’s r≥ .585; p< .001) and 
WTB (all Pearson’s r≥ .279; p< .001) correlated significantly with interest in buying. However, the 
WTB measure of the Oral-B Professional Care 3000 showed a non-significant positive correlation of 
r= .106, p> .100 (see Appendices 9–10). 
In addition, this study followed the analysis in Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002, p. 234) and controlled 
for strategic deviation in both conditions. It used the same indicators of overbidding and underbidding, 
which it obtained from the third part of the questionnaire after the announcement of the relevant 
purchase situation and the individually drawn prices.  
The analysis involved an examination of whether participants complied with their purchase obligation 
and were satisfied with their decision. The argumentation is based on the assumption that not getting 
the product at a price below one’s WTP, as well as overpaying one’s WTP, results in dissatisfaction or 
even a refusal to obey the purchase obligation. Since all buyers complied with their purchase 
obligation in the BDM and DCT condition and were mainly satisfied with their decision (on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied), BDM: M=5.24, SD=1.85; DCT: 
M=5.46, SD=1.78), they did not seem to have significantly understated or overstated their true WTP.  
As suggested by Kaas and Ruprecht (2006), this study additionally tested behavioral incentive 
compatibility in the BDM condition. However, the actual outcome for each participant (i.e., the drawn 
product and price) was not recorded as in Kaas and Ruprecht (2006); this study used the hypothetical 
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question on the willingness to revise the decision of the binding situation ex-post instead. The result 
indicates that 14.2% (20%) in the BDM (DCT) condition would change their WTP statement if they 
could. This procedure leaves us with a somewhat weaker indicator than that used by Kaas and 
Ruprecht (2006). However, subjects evaluated the purchase occasion at the resulting price on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale from “too expensive, bad deal” to “very good deal.” In combination with the 
dichotomous choice whether participants wanted to change their decision in the drawn binding 
purchase situation, this study was partially able to estimate their bidding strategy. This indicator 
should yield valid results, as the situation closely resembles a real shopping situation in which the 
price is given, and subjects need to evaluate the purchase occasion at this given price (Kaas & 
Ruprecht, 2006, p. 42). Respondents who wanted to change their decision and simultaneously said the 
product was a bad deal probably had bid too much, while the respondents who thought the product 
was a good deal most likely had underbid. In case of a neutral evaluation of the deal, this study was 
not able to assume underbidding or overbidding. Our approach classifies 3.8% (17%) of the subjects in 
the BDM (DCT) as potential underbidders, and 7.5% (0%) of subjects as potential overbidders (see 
Tables 2 and 3).  
Table 2: Possible underbidding and overbidding in the BDM 
 
Evaluation: purchase 
is a good deal 
Evaluation: product is 
too expensive, bad deal 
Evaluation: neutral, 
neither good nor bad deal 
I want to change 
my decision 
Possible 
underbidding 
3.8% of subjects 
Possible overbidding 
7.5% of subjects 
Not indicative 
2.8% of subjects 
I do not want to 
change my decision 
Possible truthful 
bidding 
40.6% of subjects 
Possible truthful bidding 
20.8% of subjects 
Not indicative 
24.5% of subjects 
 
Table 3: Possible underbidding and overbidding in the DCT 
 
Evaluation: purchase 
is a good deal 
Evaluation: product is 
too expensive, bad deal 
Evaluation: neutral, 
neither good nor bad deal 
I want to change 
my decision 
Possible 
underbidding 
17% of subjects 
Possible overbidding 
0% of subjects 
Not indicative  
3% of subjects 
I do not want to 
change my decision 
Possible truthful 
bidding  
65% of subjects 
Possible truthful bidding 
5% of subjects 
Not indicative 
10% of subjects 
 
To further test criterion validity, this study analyzed whether participants were willing to pay more for 
products they found to be relevant for purchase than for products they found not to be relevant. As 
expected, the analysis shows that WTP for relevant products is significantly higher than for non-
relevant ones, with one exception: All t≥ 3.536, p≤ .001 and χ²≥ 18.290, p≤ .000 show a significant 
difference (see Appendices 11 and 12). Only the values for the Oral-B Professional Care 3000 WTP 
(t(15.653)= 2.087, p= .054) and WTB (χ²(1)= 3.171, p= .209) do not differ significantly. However, this 
seems to be due to the very low number of participants willing to buy the toothbrush, as WTP was 
found to be more than twice as high for participants that indicated the Oral-B Professional Care 3000 
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to be relevant (€13.08 vs. €26.33), and there was a more than eightfold increase in WTB (1.1% vs. 
9.1%). 
All in all, the current research finds both measures to have satisfactory face and criterion validity. 
However, the BDM seems to produce fewer participants willing to revise their decision ex-post.  
4.2 Predictive Validity of the BDM 
In an identical setting (time, place, general setup) using a matched sample that does not show any 
structural differences (see Section 3), the current research found a significant difference between the 
results of the BDM and DCT procedure. 
To compare the BDM with the DCT, this study used the predicted PR from the BDM, which is the 
ratio of respondents who indicated a WTP equal to or above the chosen price point8, and the real PR 
from the validation sample in the DCT condition. For example, in the case of the Oral-B 500 
toothbrush, one can see at the price of €19.99 a predicted PR of 21.3% in the BDM, and 16.2% in the 
DCT condition. Between both measures, the difference (in this example, 5.1 percentage points) for 
each of the eight products was calculated (see Table 3).  
Table 3: Difference in PR between BDM and DCT 
Product 
1st selling 
price 
in DCT 
PR 
(BDM) 
in % 
N = 108 
PR 
(DCT) 
in % 
N = 99 
GAP 
in 
pp 
2nd 
selling 
price 
in 
DCT 
PR 
(BDM) 
in % 
N = 108 
PR 
(DCT) 
in % 
N = 
99 
GAP in 
pp 
Oral-B 
Professional Care 
500 
19.99 € 21.3 16.2   5.1 14.99 € 35.2 24.2 10.9 
Oral-B 
Professional Care 
3000 
39.99 € 14.8   2.0 12.8 29.99 € 24.1   7.1 17.0 
Johnnie Walker 
Red Label 
  9.99 € 26.9 23.2   3.6   7.99 € 42.6 31.3 11.3 
Johnnie Walker 
Black Label 
19.99 € 25.0 19.2   5.8 14.99 € 36.1 27.3   8.8 
Intenso Memory 
Station 320GB 
34.99 € 15.7 10.1   5.6 24.99 € 35.2 17.2 18.0 
Intenso Memory 
Station 500GB 
39.99 € 16.8 24.2  -7.4 34.99 € 28.7 27.3   1.4 
Sony MDR-ZX300 19.99 € 21.3 16.2   5.1 14.99 € 39.8 23.2 16.6 
Sony MDR-ZX600 34.99 € 15.9 13.1   2.8 30.99 € 16.8 12.1   4.7 
 
To test whether this difference between the BDM and DCT is significant, an independent samples t-
test was conducted. Indeed, the PR in the BDM are significantly lower than in DCT (t(30)= 2.48, 
p=.019). Moreover, a non-parametric test to support the results of the t-test and account for the low 
number of observations was conducted. The Mann-Whitney U test shows similar results and predicts a 
                                                          
8 In order to transfer individual WTP into PR, this study assumed that all prices up to the stated WTP are 
acceptable for purchase, as it is common practice in price research. Thus, leaving aside the possibility of too low 
prices, this might be an indication of quality issues and therefore lead to a situation where participants do not 
purchase the good below an individual floor price as Van Westendorp (1976) suggested. 
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medium-effect size for the difference between the BDM and DCT results (U= 77, z= -1.92, p= .056, r= 
-.34). Thus H1a can be rejected, as this research finds a significant difference between the results of 
both procedures. 
4.3 Investigating the Gap Between BDM and DCT Estimates 
There were several steps to test hypotheses H1b through H1d. First, as suggested by Müller et al. 
(2010, p. 118), one can see that participants in the DCT condition (M= 4.71, SD= 1.31) rate the 
procedure as more realistic than the ones in the BDM condition (M= 4.27, SD= 1.357) (t(205)= 2.363, 
p= .019). This assertion supports the intended scenario in which we like to compare the BDM results 
with results that are closer to a more realistic purchase situation. This difference in the perceived 
degree of realism might already explain the difference between BDM predictions and DCT results. 
However, an independent samples t-test shows no significant difference in WTP between participants 
scoring above the mean rating of the degree of realism (7-point Likert-scale type, M= 4.48, SD= 1.35) 
and those scoring below the mean (all t≤ 1.239, p≥ .219, see Appendix 13). Thus, H1b finds no 
support.  
In order to investigate the difference between the BDM and DCT (hypotheses H1c and H1d), this 
study tested whether the gap might be explained by two attributes. As suggested by de Meza and 
Reyniers (2013), as well as Kaas and Ruprecht (2006), a potential source of bias in the BDM results 
might be the individual risk attitude. An independent samples t-test shows no significant difference in 
risk attitude between the BDM and DCT condition (t(204)= .858, p= .392, see Appendix 4). The same 
holds for loss aversion in risky choice (number of lotteries played). The comparison between BDM 
and DCT shows no significant difference in the number of lotteries played (t(204)= .137, p= .891, see 
Appendix 4). Having found no difference between the BDM and DCT for both measures, this research 
can analyze whether risk attitude or loss aversion in risky choice might moderate WTP statements and 
thus be indicative of the measured deviation between the BDM and DCT giving rise to a potential 
gambling effect influence on BDM results. This study tested whether the WTPs or PR of respondents 
with an above-average rating in risk attitude (BDM: M= 5.35, SD= 1.76; DCT: M= 5.57, SD= 1.94) 
lead to significantly different results than those of respondents scoring below the average. However, 
all WTPs were insignificant, which suggests no difference between WTPs of more risk-averse 
respondents and less risk-averse ones in the BDM (all t≤ 1.251, p≥ .221, see Appendix 14). As 
expected, the same holds for the PR in the DCT, which does not include a lottery (all χ² ≤ 2.369,  
p≥ .124, see Appendix 15). Furthermore, we analyzed whether the degree of loss aversion might 
interact with the BDM procedure and thus produce significantly different WTP for participants having 
a higher-than-average degree versus a lower-than-average degree of loss aversion (number of lotteries 
played). Again, all WTPs were insignificant, which suggests no difference between WTPs for different 
degrees of loss aversion (all t≤ .867, p≥ .388, see Appendix 16); the same holds for the PR in the DCT 
(all χ² ≤ 3.214, p≥ .073, see Appendix 17). This means hypotheses H1c and H1d can be rejected. 
Having found no indication for WTP differences between different degrees of risk attitude and loss 
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aversion in BDM results, this analysis cannot support the notion of a gambling effect interacting with 
the BDM procedure and therefore biasing WTP estimates.  
Further, this study tested the relative explanatory power of risk attitude, loss aversion in risky choice 
(number of lotteries played), and interest in buying. In particular, this study investigated with logistic 
regressions whether the distinction between predicted buyer and predicted non-buyer could be 
explained using these variables. In general, risk attitude and loss aversion cannot significantly explain 
whether the BDM procedure classifies someone as a buyer or a non-buyer, which suggests that neither 
variable might influence the WTP in a BDM setting. When the dependent variable of predicted buyer 
(vs. non-buyer) is regressed on loss aversion in risky choices (number of lotteries played) or on risk 
attitude, the logit model is – with the exception of one case – insignificant (all χ²(1)≤ 2.320, p≥ .128, 
see Appendices 18a and 18d). The logit model for the Sony MDR-ZX300 at the first selling price 
shows a χ² value of 3.904 (df= 1) and a p-value of .048. A logit model with the two independent 
variables risk attitude and loss aversion in risky choice (number of lotteries played) yields a model χ² 
of 6.862 (df= 2) with a corresponding p-value of .032; for the model variable risk attitude, a significant 
p-value of .037. However, this might potentially be a type 1 error. Both pseudo R² values in the single 
independent variable model (Cox and Snell R²= .036, Nagelkerke R²= .057), as well as in the model 
with two independent variables (Cox and Snell R²= .063, Nagelkerke R²= .099), indicate very limited 
improvement of the full model over the intercept model. Moreover, the logit model with one single 
independent and the one with two independent variables, as well as the independent variable risk 
attitude itself, becomes insignificant for the second selling price, χ²(1)= 1.373 with p= .241 and χ²(2)= 
1.584 with p= .453. Interest in buying is the only variable that significantly contributes to the 
distinction between predicted buyer and predicted non-buyer. The independent variable interest in 
buying becomes significant when it is added to the logit model. Neither risk attitude or loss aversion in 
risky choices (number of lotteries played) is significant in any of the logit models that include interest 
in buying (see Appendices 18b, 18c and 18e). 
To see whether the determinants of risk attitude that have been suggested by Dohmen et al. (2011) 
help to explain the segmentation into (predicted) buyer and (predicted) non-buyer, this study compared 
the distinct sub-groups for each of the eight products with each other: real buyer versus real non-buyer 
in DCT (see Appendix 19a), predicted buyer versus predicted non-buyer in BDM (see Appendix 19b), 
predicted buyer in BDM versus real buyer in DCT (see Appendix 19c), predicted non-buyer in BDM 
versus real non-buyer in DCT (see Appendix 19d). In particular, this study compared these segments 
with regard to their structural identity using Person’s χ² test, or Fisher’s exact test if indicated. In order 
to gain a sufficiently large number of observations for each category in each cell of the contingency 
table, all metric scales were split into two groups using the median or the mean as delimiter. Three 
variables (gender, education level of father, and education level of mother) were used in their original 
form, median splits of age and body size, as well as mean splits of risk attitude, and loss aversion 
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(number of lotteries played). In most of the cases, the two groups in the comparison did not show 
significantly different results for these variables. However, in some cases, single variables indicated a 
structural difference between the subgroups under consideration. In 448 χ²-based structural identity 
checks, 12 turned out to be significant; however caution is needed interpreting these, as at least 22 
studies are expected false positives given a significance level of 5%. In particular, six incidences of a 
significant difference in gender, three in level of education of mother, and one in body size, level of 
education of father, as well as in risk attitude, were detected. The age variable did not show any 
significant difference between the subgroups. Nevertheless, some differences are even expected and 
therefore support the validity of the presented results. When comparing predicted buyer and predicted 
non-buyer with each other, as well as real buyer with real non-buyer, this research finds six significant 
differences with respect to gender in both types of whiskey. Not surprisingly, male participants are 
more likely to purchase whiskey and show a higher WTP (for details, see Appendices 19a and 19b). 
Similarly, this study expects that the significant difference and the marginally significant (p<.1) values 
in body size between the predicted buyer and predicted non-buyer of Johnnie Walker Red and Black 
Label at selling prices one and two also reflect the different tastes among genders, given that males on 
average are taller than women. In this example, in the case of a significant difference arising at selling 
price one between predicted buyer and predicted non-buyer, one will very likely find a significant 
difference in selling price two as well. This is because all predicted buyers from the higher price 
(selling price one) will be among the predicted buyers at selling price two (i.e., the lower price). 
Except for the differences in tastes for whiskey between both genders, this research did not find a 
meaningful pattern of structural differences between the compared groups. Thus, it cannot show that 
the variables, linked to risk attitude as suggested by Dohmen et al. (2011), distinguish between the 
subgroups of (predicted) buyer and (predicted) non-buyer.  
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
The expected utility hypothesis predicts that bidders reveal their true WTP in the BDM mechanism. 
However, empirical findings suggest that bids are indeed affected by, first, a grasp of the procedure 
and the dominant strategy (Kagel & Levin, 1993) and, second, potential deviations from expected 
utility due to perceived risk (de Meza & Reyniers, 2013), a gambling effect (Horowitz, 2006; 
Völckner, 2006b), or the underlying distribution of prices (Bohm et al., 1997; Horowitz, 2006; Tymula 
et al., 2013). 
This research finds empirical evidence for a deviation of the predicted PR from BDM compared with 
the real PR of the DCT. The BDM was found to overstate real PR in 15 out of 16 price points, 
compared with a DCT situation perceived as more realistic. This overstatement of WTP is somewhat 
surprising, as in direct WTP elicitation methods – to which the BDM belongs – cognitive effort is 
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higher in order to derive one’s true WTP and the price, as part of the overall purchase situation tends 
to be somewhat overemphasized in such settings, which should lead to an underestimation of the true 
WTP (Hofstetter & Miller, 2009). Nevertheless, it seems plausible to find differences in predicted 
versus real PR because of the dissimilarity in perceived degree of realism between both procedures. In 
BDM, the respondents face a setup perceived to be less realistic; however, the question remains 
whether this perception really results in behavior that is different at the POS. The results of the current 
study can give only limited support for a significant change in corresponding behavior, as additional 
behavioral indicators, with the exception of the WTP (WTB), were not measured.  
The results of the current study and other studies (Kaas & Ruprecht, 2006; Miller et al., 2011; 
Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002) seem to be contradictory regarding the direction of the deviation 
between the BDM and DCT results. Kaas and Ruprecht (2006) suggested a systematic underbidding 
due to risk aversion in their BDM results. By contrast, this study finds that the WTP, and thus the 
predicted PR from BDM, is too high, which is in line with the findings of Müller and Voigt (2010). 
The current findings might also be supported on theoretical terms by Horowitz (2006). He suggests 
that the possibility of ex-post regret from not receiving the good at all might lead to an overstatement 
of WTP to minimize ex-post regret.  
Given the results run contrary to earlier research, it is crucial to consider possible explanations that 
might address the inconsistency. A first salient difference concerns the experimental setting. The 
current study implemented the BDM in a laboratory setting with students who consider themselves a 
relevant target group of the presented product, while Kaas and Ruprecht (2006) and Miller et al. 
(2011) conducted their experiments in class with university students, without reporting a pre-selection 
process. Obviously, different samples might influence the results; even samples from the same 
population, for example students, do not consistently react to experimental stimuli in the same way 
(Peterson & Merunka, 2014). Furthermore, this study used eight rather medium-priced shopping 
goods, instead of the low-priced, fast-moving consumer goods other studies have used. There is 
evidence suggesting that in this case respondents will make a more deliberate choice (Deshpande & 
Hoyer, 1983; Holton, 1958; Hoyer, 1984; Kaish, 1967). This study did not track whether this has been 
the case, and one cannot be sure a more careful decision process would influence WTP bids 
significantly. However, all studies were set in a monopolistic context, participants were told about the 
dominant strategy of the BDM mechanism, and results were compared with real transaction data, 
albeit elicited at different selling point settings (field vs. laboratory). Nevertheless, bidders in the 
former settings seemed to deviate downward, whereas bidders in the latter setting seemed to deviate 
upward. It is possible that, in a real POS setting, participants might define their WTP more carefully, 
and thus risk-averse subjects in particular would rather underestimate their WTP (Kaas & Ruprecht, 
2006). By contrast, less risk-averse subjects might not deviate from true WTP or even be willing to bid 
above their actual WTP. However, this research found no significant difference in WTP and WTB for 
any risk type of bidder (risk attitude and loss aversion) influencing BDM estimates and as-expected 
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DCT results; see Appendices 14-17. Even so, it did not find any support for an influence of the 
individual risk attitude or loss aversion (number of lotteries played) on WTP and WTB measures; this 
study cannot tell whether the perceived risk might have such an effect. It might well be that the degree 
of perceived risk between the BDM and DCT procedures differs significantly between both methods 
and therefore mitigates the differences in (predicted) PR. 
While the gambling effect was also suggested as a potential reason for biased BDM results (Völckner, 
2006a; Müller & Voigt, 2010), this study could not find empirical support for this contention. 
According to the literature from decision theory, this is not surprising, as the gambling effect is based 
on the availability of a risky and simultaneously non-risky option within the same choice set 
(Bleichrodt & Schmidt, 2002). However, the classical BDM offers no such non-risky option. It is 
debatable whether a bid of €0.00 defines a riskless option. Similarly, this study cannot exclude the 
possibility that participants of the study did not consider an outside option during the elicitation of the 
WTP, which was not controlled for in the experiment. Thus, it still might be that participants 
considered the possibility of buying the products outside the laboratory as a riskless reference 
situation. Nevertheless, the extensive analysis of the potential influence of risk attitude and loss 
aversion in risky choice on WTP (WTB) within this study cannot completely rule out the potential 
influence of these factors. However, the presented results suggest a very limited influence. 
Nevertheless, if perceived risk does play a role, it might be possible to prevent the results from being 
biased. A “cheap talk design,” suggested by Cummings and Taylor (1999), might lead to a situation in 
which respondents price this perceived risk into their decisions. Research in the realm of priming 
supports the fruitfulness of this approach (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
In light of several studies finding under-prediction and over-prediction, it seems plausible that an 
underlying yet unknown motive moderates these two aspects in the BDM procedure. Kaas and 
Ruprecht (2006) suggest that this might be because of product familiarity. However, and more 
plausible, a part of the respondent’s underlying goal function, as it directly enters the bidding strategy 
of respondents. Precisely what is the respondent looking for during the elicitation of WTP? It might be 
a good bargain or the actual product, and Appendix 20 suggests such a moderating motive. Further 
research is invited to investigate this possibility in depth.  
6. Limitations 
The current study has several limitations. First, even though the respondents rated the elicitation 
method of WTP (WTB) as rather realistic, it might say nothing about their corresponding behavior. 
So, the question of how realistic they perceived the situation to be is probably not as good as the 
question whether they behaved similarly in the experimental situation as they would in a purchase 
situation at the POS.  
Second, this study used two price points in the DCT condition; even so, the product order was random 
and all the higher prices of each product were shown first for each product. This might, however, have 
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anchored the respondents. It might be that in order to be consistent and avoid cognitive dissonance, the 
subjects recalled whether they had bought the product at the first offered price and then stuck to that 
decision without an independent new consideration of the current situation. However, this might work 
for purchases and non-purchases, and therefore cancels out.  
Third, this study elicited WTP and WTB in monopolistic situations due to the used monadic product 
offers. Even so, this was true for both procedures and should therefore not matter when comparing 
both. However, it is not completely clear how the WTP/WTB changes in relation to each other in 
competitive designs. Research findings from experimental economics suggest that a subject’s 
preference order between options can change significantly when competitive or monadic elicitation 
procedures are used (see preference reversals, Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Müller, Kroll, & Vogt, 
2012b). 
Fourth, the existing literature on binding (incentive compatible) WTP/WTB concentrates on rather 
low-value, fast-moving consumer goods (e.g., food). The usage of moderately priced shopping goods 
has not been considered so far, giving rise to the question of whether earlier results apply to the 
current setting in which customers are supposed to enter into a more demanding decision process in 
which they carefully consider quality and price (AMA; Kaish, 1967, p. 29). 
Fifth, consumers might simply not be able to determine their true WTP if their preferences are rather 
constructive than pre-defined (Bettman et al., 1998). In general, one needs to be careful in accessing 
the external validity of any WTP elicitation method as WTP is a latent construct and thus not directly 
observable. It is not clear which procedure is finally closer to the true WTP. The information content 
of the current findings, therefore, is limited. Having said that, it becomes clear that besides pure 
method comparisons (convergent validity), additional real transaction data from POS is needed to 
evaluate external validity. The approach used in the current study sits in the middle of these attempts 
of assessing external validity as it uses two different elicitation methods in an, even in terms of time, 
identical setting. However, these results should be further tested and replicated in order to test the 
generalizability of BDM results (Hubbard & Armstrong, 1994) to support scientific knowledge base 
updates (Lehmann & Bengart, 2015).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the usage of students has its limitations, and therefore, results need 
further replications before they might be generalized beyond the research setting (Peterson, 2001). 
However, in the light of time and budget constraints and to be consistent with prior research on the 
validity of the BDM (see e.g, de Meza & Reyniers, 2013; Müller et al., 2010; Wertenbroch & Skiera, 
2002), this study used students as well, although knowing that the generalization to other student 
populations might be questionable (Peterson & Merunka, 2014). Nevertheless, the defined target 
population can reasonably be considered a regular and profitable buyer segment within the general 
target group of the eight products being tested.  
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8. Appendix 
1) Product catalogue page, example external hard drive  
(full material available on request ) 
 
  
32 
 
2) Product setup and selling prices in DCT 
Product group Product Market price (in €) 
1st selling 
price  
in DCT  
(in €) 
2nd selling 
price  
in DCT  
(in €) 
1. toothbrush 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 30.90 (Amazon.de) 19.99 14.99 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 67.16 (Amazon.de) 39.99 29.99 
2. whiskey 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 12.99 (local retail) 9.99 7.99 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 29.45 (local retail) 19.99 14.99 
3. external 
hard drive 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 46.39 (Amazon.de) 34.99 24.99 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 52.99 (Amazon.de) 39.99 34.99 
4. headphones 
Sony MDR-ZX300 24.44 (Amazon.de) 19.99 14.99 
Sony MDR-ZX600 44.99 (Amazon.de) 34.99 30.99 
3) Experimental Session Schedule 
Time/day Monday Wednesday Friday 
8 am BDM DCT BDM & DCT 
10 am BDM DCT BDM & DCT 
12 am BDM DCT BDM & DCT 
2 pm BDM DCT BDM & DCT 
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4) Structural identity test BDM versus DCT, metric variables 
Indicator Overall BDM DCT Difference  BDM vs. DCT 
N 207 107 100    
 M SD M SD M SD t df p 
Age 22.75 2.56 22.70 2.49 22.81 2.65  .305 205 .761 
Body size 177.00 9.74 176.39 9.85 177.64 9.62  .921 205 .358 
Risk attitude*  5.46 1.85 5.35 1.76 5.57 1.94  .858 204 .392 
Loss aversion* 6.98 3.10 7.01 3.13 6.95 3.08   .137 204 .891 
Pricequality importance:  
toothbrush 4.36 1.41 4.34 1.35 4.39 1.49  .272 205 .786 
Pricequality importance:  
external hard drive 3.95 1.57 3.89 1.59 4.01 1.56  .557 205 .578 
Pricequality importance:  
whiskey 4.68 1.58 3.72 1.80 3.62 1.76   .403 205 .688 
Pricequality importance:  
headphones 3.67 1.78 4.50 1.54 4.87 1.61 1.668 205 .097 
*Overall N =206 (106 BDM; 100 DCT) 
5)  Structural identity test BDM versus DCT, nominal variables 
Indicator Difference BDM vs. DCT 
 Χ² df p 
Gender 1.352 1 .245 
Education level of father  .051 205 .959 
Education level of mother  .045 205 .964 
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6)  Structural identity test BDM versus DCT: Differences in product relevance 
Product Product relevance 
Difference  
BDM vs. DCT 
Overall BDM DCT χ² df p 
N 207 107 100 - - - 
Oral-B Professional Care 500   67 (32.4%) 36 (33.6%) 31 (31.0%)  .165 1 .684 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000   26 (12.6%) 15 (14.0%) 11 (11.0%)  .429 1 .513 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 108 (52.2%) 55 (51.4%) 53 (53.0%)  .053 1 .818 
Johnnie Walker Black Label   64 (30.9%) 34 (31.8%) 30 (30.0%)  .076 1 .782 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB   56 (27.1%) 26 (24.3%) 30 (30.0%)  .851 1 .356 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB   81 (39.1%) 37 (34.6%) 44 (44.0%) 1.926 1 .165 
Sony MDRZX300   92 (44.4%) 47 (43.9%) 45 (45.0%)  .024 1 .876 
Sony MDRZX600   61 (29.5%) 36 (33.6%) 25 (25.0%) 1.859 1 .173 
7) Structural identity test BDM versus DCT: Differences in interest in buying 
Product 
Interest in buying 
Difference  
BDM vs. DCT 
  Overall BDM DCT t df p 
  N 207 107 100 
   
Oral-B Professional Care 500 
M 2.22 2.13 2.32 
 .816  205 .416 
SD 1.67 1.61 1.72 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 
M 1.59 1.70 1.48 
1.396* 179.434 .164 
SD 1.16 1.38 .86 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 
M 2.83 2.86 2.80 
  .221 205 .825 
SD 1.94 2.00 1.88 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 
M 2.52 2.56 2.47 
  .344 205 .732 
SD 1.90 1.92 1.88 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 
M 2.46 2.41 2.51 
 .388 205 .698 
SD 1.83 1.81 1.85 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 
M 2.87 2.76 3.00 
 .811 205 .418 
SD 2.15 2.03 2.28 
Sony MDRZX300 
M 2.93 2.92 2.94 
 .088 205 .930 
SD 1.96 2.04 1.89 
Sony MDRZX600 
M 2.62 2.53 2.71 
 .667 205 .499 
SD 1.88 1.84 1.93 
* Welch’s t-test        
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8) Mean WTP check between the first four sessions and successive sessions 
Product Mean WTP (SD) Difference first successive t df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 9.60 (8.15) 11.81 (10.46) 1.087* 52.365 .282 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 14.24 (15.64) 16.44 (18.12) 0.643 105 .522 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 6.37 (4.61) 6.50 (4.83) 0.137 105 .891 
Johnnie Walker Black Label   10.10 (8.58) 12.17 (10.37) 1.087 105 .279 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 16.20 (13.28) 17.51 (15.50) 0.451 105 .653 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 19.69 (15.72) 21.40 (19.11) 0.454* 54.591 .651 
Sony MDR-ZX300   10.79 (8.16)   11.56 (8.15) 0.452 105 .652 
Sony MDR-ZX600 17.85 (13.69) 16.76 (13.13) 0.385 104 .701 
* Welch’s t-test      
9) Correlations between interest in buying and WTP 
Product Pearson’s r Bootstrapped confidence intervalsa 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 .649* [.753 ; .508] 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 .635* [.765 ; .435] 
Johnnie Walker Red Label .710* [.785 ; .613] 
Johnnie Walker Black Label .705* [.798 ; .590] 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB .596* [.722 ; .447] 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB .665* [.768 ; .551] 
Sony MDRZX300 .689* [.782 ; .580] 
Sony MDRZX600 .649* [.754 ; .515] 
a [upper ; lower]   
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p <0.1.   
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10) Correlations between interest in buying and WTB 
Product Selling price Pearson’s r Bootstrapped confidence intervalsa 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 1st   .593* [.707 ; .449] 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 1st .106  [.358 ; -.111] 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 1st   .531* [.660 ; .380] 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 1st   .695* [.790 ; .567] 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 1st   .479* [.603 ; .323] 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 1st   .683* [.784 ; .567] 
Sony MDRZX300 1st   .531* [.668 ; .355] 
Sony MDRZX600 1st   .597* [.710 ; .459] 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 2nd   .622* [.744 ; .496] 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 2nd   .279*  [.495 ; .002] 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 2nd   .697* [.785 ; .580] 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 2nd   .713* [.811 ; .584] 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 2nd   .507* [.636 ; .364] 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 2nd   .680* [.787 ; .551] 
Sony MDRZX300 2nd   .583* [.710 ; .450] 
Sony MDRZX600 2nd   .573* [.691 ; .430] 
a [upper ; lower]    
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p <0.1.    
11) WTP for relevant versus non relevant products 
Product Mean WTP (SD) Difference not relevant relevant t df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500   7.36 (6.85) 16.09 (9.85)  4.766* 52.693 .000 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 13.08 (14.18) 26.33 (23.92)  2.087* 15.643 .054 
Johnnie Walker Red Label   3.78 (3.76)   8.90 (4.04)  6.773 105 .000 
Johnnie Walker Black Label   7.58 (7.44) 17.59 (8.95)  6.067 105 .000 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 13.44 (12.45) 26.49 (14.02)  4.509 105 .000 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 16.06 (15.37) 28.13 (16.74)   3.747 105 .000 
Sony MDRZX300   1.75 (1.10)   4.40 (1.80) 12.393 143 .000 
Sony MDRZX600 14.15 (11.35) 24.28 (14.96)  3.536* 53.938 .001 
* Welch’s t-test      
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12) Purchase rates difference between relevant versus non relevant products for 1st selling price in 
DCT 
Product Purchase rates Difference not relevant relevant χ² df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 1.4% 48.4% 35.064 1   .000* 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 1.1%   9.1%   3.171 1   .209* 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 0.0% 43.4% 26.489 1 .000 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 2.9% 56.7% 39.509 1 .000 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 1.4% 30.0% 19.048 1   .000* 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 1.8% 52.3% 34.433 1 .000 
Sony MDRZX300 1.8% 33.3% 18.290 1 .000 
Sony MDRZX600 4.0% 40.0% 21.485 1   .000* 
* Fisher’s Exact Test.    
13) WTP differences between below versus above the mean degree of realism.  
Product Mean WTP (SD) Difference low high t df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 9.54 (8.53) 11.23 (9.47) .968 105 .335 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 13.13 (14.60) 17.17 (18.32) 1.239* 88.889 .219 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 6.20 (4.39) 6.67 (5.01) .513 105 .609 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 10.32 (8.44) 11.30 (10.09) .537* 91.664 .592 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 15.40 (13.24) 18.10 (14.81) .995 105 .322 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 19.03 (15.33) 21.71 (18.51) .804* 91.105 .423 
Sony MDRZX300 11.01 (7.68) 11.07 (8.73) .040 105 .968 
Sony MDRZX600 16.10 (12.53) 19.19 (14.46) 1.177 104 .242 
* Welch’s t-test  
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14) WTP of respondents below versus above the mean risk level  
Product Mean WTP in € (SD) Difference below mean above mean t df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500   9.88 (9.25) 10.31 (8.45) .248 104 .804 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000   13.01 (15.73)   15.99 (16.77) .946 104 .346 
Johnnie Walker Red Label  6.22 (4.80)  6.56 (4.62) .377 104 .707 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 10.20 (8.79)  11.08 (9.58) .492 104 .623 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB  17.30 (14.00)   15.62 (13.78) .620 104 .537 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB   20.70 (16.28)  19.39 (17.18) .402 104 .689 
Sony MDRZX300 12.00 (8.60) 10.05 (7.64) 1.231 104 .221 
Sony MDRZX600   17.80 (13.82)  16.92 (13.17)  .331 103 .741 
 
15)  WTB of respondents below versus above the mean risk level  
Product (selling price) PR in % Difference below mean above mean Χ² df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 (1) 11.90 18.97 .904 1 .342 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 (1) 2.38 1.72 .054* 1 1.00 
Johnnie Walker Red Label (1) 28.58 18.97 1.269 1 .260 
Johnnie Walker Black Label (1) 11.90 24.14 2.369 1 .124 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB (1) 7.14 12.07 .657* 1 .513 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB (1) 21.42 25.86 .263 1 .608 
Sony MDRZX300 (1) 11.9 18.97 .904 1 .342 
Sony MDRZX600 (1) 7.14 17.24 2.196 1 .138 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 (2) 16.67 29.31 2.135 1 .144 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 (2) 9.52 6.90 .228* 1 .717 
Johnnie Walker Red Label (2) 30.95 31.03 .000 1 .993 
Johnnie Walker Black Label (2) 21.42  31.03 1.140 1 .286 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB (2) 14.29 18.97 .378 1 .539 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB (2) 26.19 27.59 .024 1 .877 
Sony MDRZX300 (2) 19.05 25.86 .639 1 .424 
Sony MDRZX600 (2) 7.14 15.51 1.618 1 .203 
* Fisher’s exact test 
 
16) WTP of respondents below versus above the mean level of loss aversion (number of lotteries 
played) 
Product Mean WTP in € (SD) Difference below mean above mean t df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 10.30 (9.73) 9.97 (8.11) .191 104 .849 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 13.41 (15.52) 15.50 (16.64) .655 104 .514 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 6.40 (4.86) 6.41 (4.59) .016 104 .988 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 9.91 (8.49) 11.23 (9.70) .016 104 .988 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 16.48 (14.51) 16.33 (13.44) .057 104 .954 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 18.26 (16.88) 21.21 (16.61) .867 104 .388 
Sony MDRZX300 10.97 (8.58) 10.94 (7.83) .021 104 .984 
Sony MDRZX600 18.53 (14.15) 16.47 (12.91) .774 103 .441 
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17) WTB of respondents below versus above the mean level of loss aversion (number of lotteries 
played) 
Product (selling price) PR in % Difference below mean above mean Χ² df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 (1) 11.11 20.00 1.455 1 .228 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 (1) 0.00 3.64 1.670* 1 .500 
Johnnie Walker Red Label (1) 22.22 21.18 .028 1 .867 
Johnnie Walker Black Label (1) 24.44 14.55 1.576 1 .209 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB (1) 15.55 5.45 2.806* 1 .108 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB (1) 24.44 23.64 .009 1 .925 
Sony MDRZX300 (1) 20.00 12.73 .973 1 .324 
Sony MDRZX600 (1) 13.33 12.73 .974 1 .324 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 (2) 22.22 25.45 .142 1 .707 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 (2) 4.44 10.91 1.405* 1 .289 
Johnnie Walker Red Label (2) 31.11 30.91 .000 1 .983 
Johnnie Walker Black Label (2) 26.66 27.27 .005 1 .946 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB (2) 24.44 10.91 3.214 1 .073 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB (2) 26.66 27.27 .005 1 .946 
Sony MDRZX300 (2) 28.88 18.18 1.602 1 .206 
Sony MDRZX600 (2) 11.11 12.73 .061 1 .805 
* Fisher’s Exact test 
40
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20) WTP differences depending on buying motive (bargain seeking below vs. above the mean). 
Product Mean WTP (SD) Difference below mean above mean t df p 
Oral-B Professional Care 500 7.21 (7.40) 12.54 (9.38) 3.282* 104.222 .001 
Oral-B Professional Care 3000 9.46 (13.82) 18.92 (17.10) 3.162* 103.719 .002 
Johnnie Walker Red Label 5.54 (4.45) 7.04 (4.75) 1.662 105 .100 
Johnnie Walker Black Label 8.63 (8.14) 12.31 (9.65) 2.080 105 .040 
Intenso Memory Station 320GB 15.00 (13.15) 17.79 (14.51) 1.022 105 .309 
Intenso Memory Station 500GB 16.80 (15.65) 22.72 (17.28) 1.819 105 .072 
Sony MDR-ZX300 9.06 (7.44) 12.47 (8.36) 2.180 105 .032 
Sony MDR-ZX600 14.87 (12.73) 19.44 (13.76) 1.744 104 .084 
* Welch’s t-test      
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